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OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 Appellant Keith Jones, who is currently incarcerated at 
New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, filed this complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for 
violation of his constitutional rights.  Jones named as 
defendants six employees of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections.  The gravamen of Jones's claim is that his right to 
due process was denied in connection with a prison disciplinary 
charge for which he was originally adjudged guilty and served 
time in detention before it was reversed. 
     I.       
Facts and Procedural History 
 The disciplinary charge was based on the following 
facts:  On August 20, 1991, Senior Corrections Officer Marren of 
the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton found a letter that stated 
that "Twin, Malik and myself is [sic] waiting on those things 
(fiber Joints (shank) . . ."  App. at 40.  Prison officials 
determined that "Twin" referred to appellant Jones.  Based on 
this letter, Jones was charged with attempting to possess a 
weapon.  On August 21, 1991, Jones was removed from the 
mainstream prison population and placed in what the district 
court referred to as the "hole" pending a hearing.  
  On August 28, 1991, defendant Gary Sheppard, a hearing 
officer, conducted an administrative hearing in which this letter 
and a confidential report constituted the evidence against Jones, 
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and at which Jones was found guilty of attempting to possess 
weapons.  As a result of the administrative ruling, Jones was 
placed in detention for fifteen days, and it was recommended that 
he lose 180 days commutation credits and that he be subjected to 
180 days of administrative segregation.  Jones appealed this 
decision through administrative channels.  On September 9, 1991, 
defendant Vernon Johnson, the Assistant Superintendent, upheld 
the decision of Hearing Officer Sheppard.  Jones sought 
reconsideration of this decision, which was denied by 
Superintendent Howard Beyer on September 16, 1991. 
 Jones then appealed to the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Appellate Division.  In an opinion dated July 14, 1993, 
that court reversed the decision of the prison officials and 
vacated the sanctions imposed on Jones, finding that the decision 
was not based on substantial evidence.  The Appellate Division 
court found the confidential report to lack probative value and 
characterized the evidence against Jones "as superficial at 
best."  Jones v. Department of Corrections, No. A-3121-91T5 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 1993) (per curiam) at 2, reprinted 
in App. at 41. 
 Jones then filed this action in federal court.  
Defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds.  First they 
argued that Jones's complaint was barred by the statute of 
limitations, using as the filing date the official filing which 
followed the court's evaluation of Jones's in forma pauperis 
application, rather than the date on which the complaint was 
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received.  Second, the defendants interposed a res judicata 
defense. 
 The district court rejected defendants' argument that 
the suit was time barred, finding that the relevant date for 
statute of limitations purposes was the date of receipt of 
Jones's complaint.  However, the district court granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, agreeing that Jones's 
action was barred by application of the doctrine of res judicata 
and New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine.  The court reasoned 
that the judgment in the New Jersey state case was final, had 
been adjudicated on the merits, and involved the same parties and 
the same occurrence or transaction.  As a result, Jones was 
barred from raising any claims which he could have raised in the 
first action.  The court determined that Jones could have raised 
the section 1983 claim asserted here in the New Jersey state 
court proceeding, and thus found this action to be barred. 
 Jones filed a timely pro se appeal to this court. 
II. 
Discussion1 
 Federal courts must apply the doctrine of res judicata 
to civil actions brought under section 1983 and in this context 
"must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect 
as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in 
which the judgment was rendered."  Migra v. Warren City School 
                     
1Defendants do not raise the statute of limitations issue on 
appeal, and thus we confine ourselves to the res judicata/entire 
controversy issue. 
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Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).  The principles of res 
judicata are reinforced in New Jersey by the entire controversy 
doctrine which "requires that all issues of a single dispute 
between the parties must be completely determined in one action." 
Culver v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 559 A.2d 400, 406 (N.J. 1989). 
 Under New Jersey law, res judicata or claim preclusion 
applies when (1) the judgment in the first action is valid, final 
and on the merits; (2) there is identity of the parties, or the 
parties in the second action are in privity with those in the 
first action; and (3) the claim in the later action grows out of 
the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the first 
action.  See Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 
A.2d 592, 599 (N.J. 1991); Culver, 559 A.2d at 405-06. 
 It is evident that the first condition for application 
of res judicata has been met in that the Appellate Division 
decision was final, valid and on the merits.  In addition, it 
appears that the employees of the Department of Corrections, who 
are the defendants in this action, may be considered to be the 
same or in privity with the Department of Corrections, which was 
the defendant in the first action, and may claim the benefit of 
res judicata if it would apply to the Department itself.  See 
Rodziewicz v. Beyer, 809 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (D.N.J. 1992) 
(employees of Department of Corrections held to be in identity 
with the Department for claim preclusion under New Jersey law). 
Moreover, the entire controversy doctrine is applicable not only 
to related claims but also to related parties.  See Cogdell v. 
Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178 (N.J. 1989). 
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 Nonetheless, we do not decide whether the second prong of res 
judicata has been met in this case, nor do we decide whether the 
third prong, which requires that the claim in the second action 
grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in 
the state court action, applies here.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has directed courts to consider: 
(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for 
relief are the same (that is, whether the wrong for 
which redress is sought is the same in both actions); 
(2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) 
whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial 
are the same (that is, whether the same evidence 
necessary to maintain the second action would support 
the first); and (4) whether the material facts alleged 
are the same. 
Culver, 559 A.2d at 406 (citations omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)).  The 
district court applied the criteria set forth in Culver and 
concluded that Jones's federal action involved the same 
transaction or occurrence as at issue in the earlier New Jersey 
Superior Court action. 
  We believe that a persuasive argument can be made that 
neither the acts complained of nor the demand for relief in the 
two actions are the same.  In the first action, Jones challenged 
the administrative determination of his guilt on the attempted 
possession of weapons charge; thus the acts at issue in that case 
were those of Jones.  By contrast, in the federal action, Jones 
challenges the conduct of the Department of Corrections' 
officials in proceeding with the disciplinary hearing and 
sanctions "knowing they had no just cause."  App. at 7.  Although 
the district court was correct that whether plaintiff's right to 
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due process was violated will be implicated in both cases, there 
are differences, albeit subtle, between the two actions.  Because 
we believe another issue is dispositive, for our purposes we will 
assume that the district court did not err in finding the 
similarity requisite for application of res judicata.  
 Instead, we part with the district court in its 
determination that the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate 
Division would have heard Jones's section 1983 claim as part of 
its review over the prison disciplinary action, had Jones 
presented it at that time.  
 It is unquestioned that state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with federal courts to hear section 1983 claims. See 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).  However, under the 
entire controversy doctrine, a party will not be barred from 
raising claims that he could not have brought in the initial 
action.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, if 
the court in the first action would clearly not have 
had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or 
ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have 
declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion), 
then a second action in a competent court presenting 
the omitted theory or ground should not be held 
precluded. 
 
Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 25 cmt. e (1982)); see also Culver, 559 A.2d at 406. 
Thus, to invoke the principles of res judicata, the first court 
must not only have had jurisdiction to hear the claim now sought 
to be precluded, but there must also be some likelihood that it 
would have exercised that jurisdiction to hear that claim. 
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 Under New Jersey Rules of Appellate Practice 2:2-3(2), 
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction 
over appeals from administrative agencies.  New Jersey Rule of 
Appellate Practice 2:10-5 provides that "[t]he appellate court 
may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the 
complete determination of any matter on review."  This Rule was 
relied upon by the district court in its decision that New Jersey 
law would not have barred Jones from raising his section 1983 
claim at the time he appealed the administrative action to the 
Appellate Division. 
 The New Jersey courts have suggested that under this 
Rule the appellate courts have jurisdiction to make factual 
findings that ordinarily would be remanded to the trial courts 
when this is necessary to the complete determination of disputes 
before them.  See, e.g., State v. Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559, 567 
(N.J. 1989) ("[W]hen an appellate court finds a clear abuse of 
discretion, it has the power to make new fact-findings.  The 
power to review evidence and reach independent determinations of 
the facts encompasses the power to call for additional evidence 
to supplement the record") (citations omitted)); State v. 
Rodriguez, 357 A.2d 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (per 
curiam) (Appellate Division exercised original jurisdiction to 
determine whether there had been manifest denial of justice under 
the law, an issue not decided by the Superior Court, but 
necessary to completely determine the matter); State v. Odom, 273 
A.2d 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (per curiam) (Appellate 
Division could make findings of fact justifying denial of post-
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conviction relief where trial court had failed to do so rather 
than remand). 
 The leading case applying this Rule in the context of 
an appeal of an administrative decision is Pascucci v. Vagott, 
362 A.2d 566 (N.J. 1976), where the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
construed Rules of Appellate Practice 2:2-3(2) and 2:10-5 
together as permitting appellate courts in actions arising under 
administrative review to exercise original jurisdiction as to 
related matters necessary to the complete resolution of a matter 
properly before an appellate court.  In that case, the Court 
determined that the Appellate Division, in reviewing a challenge 
to a regulation of the Department of Public Welfare which varied 
the amount of public assistance paid to employable versus 
unemployable persons, could exercise original jurisdiction to 
completely resolve the questions raised and decide the claim of 
one of the appellants who had argued that the local welfare 
director's discretionary authority exceeded that provided by 
statute, a claim that ordinarily would be brought in Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court.  See id. at 572-73.  The Pascucci court 
determined that because the Appellate Division had jurisdiction 
over the administrative proceedings, and because under Rule 2:10-
5 it could "exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary 
to the complete determination of any matter on review," the 
Appellate Division could also hear the challenge that would 
otherwise be heard in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.  See 
id. 
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 It does not follow from Pascucci that a New Jersey 
appellate court would exercise its power of original 
jurisdiction--ordinarily reserved for situations in which 
judicial efficiency dictates that the appellate court not remand 
a case--to resolve claims best heard by a trial court.  The 
majority of New Jersey cases applying Rule 2:10-5 represent 
instances in which appellate courts, despite the absence of trial 
court findings, had an adequate factual basis in the record to 
resolve questions that were essential to the determination of the 
issues before them.  See, e.g., In re S.H., 293 A.2d 181, 185 
(N.J. 1972) (Supreme Court reviewed undisputed evidence of record 
only, finding that it established that juvenile had committed the 
act with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt); Bruder 
v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 142 A.2d 225, 229 (N.J. 
1958) (where dispute involved exclusively legal questions 
appellate court would invoke power of original jurisdiction based 
on undisputed evidence presented to judge who incorrectly 
dismissed case for lack of jurisdiction); African Council v. 
Hadge, 604 A.2d 604, 609 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("Given 
. . . the completeness of the record, the interest of justice 
dictates that we exercise original jurisdiction pursuant to R. 
2:10-5 in fixing a counsel fee allowance."); Marion v. Manasquan, 
555 A.2d 699, 704 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) ("Although 
this specific question was not presented to the trial judge, we 
raise it now sua sponte since its resolution is necessary for a 
complete determination of the matter under review and the facts 
to resolve it are present in the record." (emphasis added)); 
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Young v. Savinon, 492 A.2d 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) 
(based on factual testimony and expert opinion presented at 
trial, Appellate Division found it unreasonable to enforce a 
particular provision in tenants' lease); Ferrari v. Melleby, 342 
A.2d 537, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("We have 
carefully reviewed the record and are satisfied that appellant's 
charges are essentially true as outlined previously, and that in 
substance they are not denied by respondents."); but cf. State v. 
Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559, 568 (N.J. 1989) (affirming appellate 
court's decision to call for additional documentary evidence, 
including autopsy report, to supplement the record in limited 
context of criminal sentencing). 
 Although an appellate court reviewing administrative 
decisions may invoke Rule 2:10-5, the scope of appellate review 
of agency decisions is generally narrow.  See, e.g., T.R. v. New 
Jersey Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 592 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (appellate court must not substitute 
own judgment for that of agency). 
 Based on our review of New Jersey cases, we predict 
that a New Jersey appellate court faced with Jones's section 1983 
claim at the time that it was evaluating his appeal of the 
administrative sanctions imposed on him would not exercise 
original jurisdiction under Rule 2:10-5.  
  Our prediction that the New Jersey Appellate Division 
court would not have exercised jurisdiction over Jones's section 
1983 claim is based in part on the sparsity of his complaint.  He 
states only that the named defendants denied him due process 
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rights by instigating administrative proceedings against him 
knowing that they lacked the requisite just cause.  Analysis of 
this claim would have required evidence not of record at the time 
of the appeal of the administrative ruling.  Because res judicata 
does not apply where a court "having jurisdiction, would clearly 
have declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion," Watkins, 
591 A.2d at 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 
cmt. e), and we conclude this is such a case, we cannot sustain 
the district court's dismissal of Jones's complaint on that 
ground.  Of course, we intimate no view as to whether there is 
any other facial defect in the pleading, as that issue was not 
considered by the district court. 
III. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment 
dismissing Jones's complaint and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  Each party to bear its own costs. 
  
